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Can CurriCulum respond to the                               
“Crisis of teChnology”?  
CurriCulum oriented towards world
Cameron Duncan and Matthew J. Kruger-Ross
A cursory look at current education policy suggests a transformation of  
education into something analogous to job training. The purpose of  such policy is 
to orient education to fit the needs of  a technologically oriented market system. The 
related demand to quantify all student progress is a manifestation of  the instrumental 
reason that has troubled the thinkers of  modernity and capitalism. It finds its common 
measure in technology. Instrumental reason can be thought of  as the stripping down 
of  reason into inputs and outputs. The embrace of  technology and its dominant form 
of  reason has led to a crisis in curriculum and learning in general. Each wave of  
technological innovation promises to be better than the previous, more responsive 
and adaptive, and is sure to cure the ills of  a broken university or education system. 
Though the ways of  addressing the form of  reason characteristic of  technology are 
many, the key problem is the reduction of  all human activity to narrowly defined ends.
In what follows we explore one way that curriculum may be able to engage 
meaningfully with the seemingly never ending cycle of  new technologies in education. 
We argue that curriculum cannot respond to any such crisis of  technology without 
embracing the concrete characteristics of  human action and experience. We elaborate 
on philosopher Martin Heidegger’s notion of  “world” as it offers a greater ontologically 
sensitivity that can greatly benefit further curricular and educational inquiry.
To speak of  curriculum in general is no easy task. It involves many places, 
people and histories and is constantly evolving. It is reasonable to presume a definition 
of  curriculum that formally indicates the what of  teaching and learning. Curriculum, 
then, is something laid out and planned by teachers or curriculum designers for learners. 
Educators speak of  the curriculum for 21st century students, for example, and develop 
elaborate systems of  objectives and outcomes that enumerate an abstract concept of  
curriculum. In a different tone curriculum theorists also try to create, implement and 
evaluate a curriculum that takes into account the needs of  the students. However, in 
treating curriculum as an object, both forms of  curriculum perpetuate the dominance 
of  instrumental reason and action. Sadly, the embrace of  technology has blurred 
the distinction between the needs of  students and the needs of  the market system it 
serves. How might an ontological sensitivity to human activity itself  allow educators to 
overcome this divide? The following is an explication of  an orientation that we hope 
will inspire curriculum theorists to begin to think ontologically about the crisis at hand. 
Heidegger’s (1927) project in Being and Time is centered on the rejection of  the 
Cartesian subject-object orientation. This position is usually attributed to Descartes 
(1637) in his work Discourse on Method where he explains how the sovereign subject 
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removes his or herself  from participatory action in the world in order to treat it as 
the source of  knowledge. The world becomes the object from which knowledge is 
derived. The relation is one where all knowledge rests on the knowing subject, who 
simultaneously imparts it onto and derives it from the world. In this way the world is 
represented as an objective thing that lends itself  to technical manipulation. Ends, and 
not human action, become the structural basis.
The radical break from Cartesianism in Heidegger’s early work is best 
described in his notion of  world. In his understanding, world is revealed to human beings 
when they use things that occupy it. Here Heidegger is not describing the physical or 
natural world, but rather indicating the interconnected web of  significance that always 
already exists regardless of  our awareness. It is only in concrete activity that humans 
are able to trace the relations that comprise a world. The most basic characteristic of  
human beings is that they exist in a world. Again, one must not hear in as referencing 
spatial reality but rather as an “in-connection-to.” The manner in which in everyday 
language we speak of  the “world of  sports” indicates Heidegger’s meaning. In the 
introduction to Being and Time, Heidegger points out that human beings already and 
always find themselves in reference to a world because humans are involved (or, we 
cope) contextually with their surroundings. 
Humanity’s general set of  coping skills potentially open us to everything. They 
allows us to mesh with and derive our being from the things we encounter. Humans 
encounter things as significant, and in doing so, reveal a world. We suggest that 
thinking through our practical relations offers the opportunity to orient curriculum 
towards world.
Heidegger explains:
Things at hand are encountered within the world… World is 
always already ‘there’ in all things at hand. World is already 
discovered beforehand together with everything encountered, 
although not thematically. However, it can also appear in certain 
ways of  dealing with the surrounding world. World is that in 
terms of  which things at hand are at hand for us. (2010, pp. 81-82)
Things that are ready for use are qualitatively different from other things 
and, thus, irreducible to  quantitative understanding. By involving ourselves with the 
entities that occupy the world, specific things and other beings, we refer to other things 
and structures. On its own, a given tool is useless. Only when a tool is brought into 
concrete use does it enter into relations with things like materials, the workshop and 
the multitude of  relations that went into constructing the tool and delivering it into the 
hand of  the human. When all these relations are thought in connection the result is a 
whole where each part has a particular place and meaning. 
Let us summarize Heidegger’s thesis as follows: human involvement alerts us 
to the foreground and background of  our world. These phenomena take one back to 
the world, which is behind everything as a structural basis: “totality of  useful things 
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is always already discovered before the individual useful thing” (2010, p. 86). The 
underlying structure of  world is what allows the concrete character of  things at hand 
to be selected as appropriate for our involvement. World is something encompassing 
that we are practically involved and has meanings which stitch human beings to other 
beings and practical activities.
 The practical activity upon which the world hangs can be seen as an 
opening. The ontological dispensation that Heidegger describes (that we are situated 
in a world) is one that can only be accessed through specifics. If  we think through the 
implications of  this ghostly presence of  world, where meaning is pointed to in practical 
action with concrete things, we are better able to see the meaning of  appropriateness 
of  actions for dealing with certain situations. The human character of  our relations 
is put into focus rather than conformity to outcomes of  human planning. It gives new 
possibilities to see our relations through practical action and not mechanical pieces 
within a larger framework. In thinking the world in this matter, what were prescribed 
ends become openings. The embrace of  qualitative difference is an essential step to 
orienting curriculum towards world. 
What would it mean to have curriculum where action is oriented towards 
world? Such a curriculum would be loosely structured, taking into account the everyday 
involvements of  its participants. It would point us to what is appropriate to deal with 
particular issues, challenges and needs. These selections would challenge teachers 
to think through the implications of  their involvements with particular students in 
a manner that not only addresses their concrete lived situation but also brings the 
student back to the larger structural framework of  meanings that they are involved in.
When we inquire into current curricular models and theories, we find a 
remarkable lack of  attention to world. Learning objectives and skill sets are treated as 
neutral and interchangeable, rather than inherently and irrevocably connected webs 
of  significance. Curriculum, whether designed by teachers or according to the needs 
of  students, remains grounded in the assumption that knowledge is simply another 
(human) resource, a cog in a wheel of  the factory. The later Heidegger will name this 
phenomenon Gestell, the positioning of  any and everything as a resource for human 
mastery and control. The “crisis” of  technology can be addressed by curriculum 
only once a greater ontological sensitivity to world is given. Following Heidegger’s 
thinking to its logical conclusion, if  human beings are always already in a world, then 
the curricular worlds in which we live and conduct scholarship are drastically reduced 
from what could be possible within curriculum. For example, to begin we could explore 
how “crisis of  technology” could be understood not as crisis but as one possible world
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